---------- Forwarded message --------- 보낸사람: Jinho Ju wnwlsgh98@gmail.com Date: 2023년 12월 21일 (목) 오후 2:52 Subject: Re: Fwd: memory leak in batadv_iv_ogm_aggregate_new To: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org, b.a.t.m.a.n@lists.open-mesh.org Cc: mareklindner@neomailbox.ch, sw@simonwunderlich.de, a@unstable.cc
Resending to everyone on the mailing list as per previous mail, adding some things that were missing.
Regarding the cause of the L2-related crash being detected by syzkaller, I can't say for sure - what I can say for sure at this point is that a memleak occurring in L2 was detected by my personal syzkaller.
Moving away from syzkaller for a moment and shifting the focus to memleak, we have to assume that the conditions for this to occur are that they reference the same network stack and are found in modules in L2, but it seems that when batman-adv is freed and returned while accessing and processing a skb in veth (L3), memleak occurs because it is trying to reference the same skb, the veth freed skb.
I'm keeping an eye on 'static netdev_tx_t veth_xmit()' as a related function, but for now, the above flow seems to be the most obvious as the root cause.
Jinho Ju, Thanks.
2023년 12월 19일 (화) 오후 7:09, Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org님이 작성:
On Tuesday, 19 December 2023 08:30:47 CET Jinho Ju wrote:
---------- Forwarded message --------- 보낸사람: Jinho Ju wnwlsgh98@gmail.com Date: 2023년 12월 19일 (화) 오후 1:58 Subject: memory leak in batadv_iv_ogm_aggregate_new To: security@kernel.org
Hello, I am "Jinho Ju" who is studying about Kernel security in Korea. A "*memory leak in batadv_iv_ogm_aggregate_new*" was reported in Syzkaller targeting 6.7-rc6 on December 19, 2023 at 02:03. The environment in which this bug was detected is as follows. Syzkaller version: 3222d10c Kernel version: LInux kernel 6.7-rc6 The report provided by Syzkaller is as follows.
Thanks. But why isn't this coordinated through the "normal" syzkaller instance? [1]
Also when looking at these backtraces, I am not sure if we are the correct recipients - but please correct me. Take as easy example batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if. This function does a clone and immediately sends it via batadv_send_broadcast_skb. At the end, it goes through batadv_send_skb_packet - a function which either does a kfree_skb or a dev_queue_xmit. A function (__dev_queue_xmit) which has in its description:
Regardless of the return value, the skb is consumedSo I would assume that something which consumes packets from this queue (so the sb_dev) is not actually doing its job correctly and leaking frames. So in my opinion, it is necessary to figure out what tried to handle the skb after it left batman-adv. Which would involve information like the underlying interfaces.
If I read the reproducer correctly, veth pairs are used as underlying interfaces.
But the setup is so convoluted with vlan, macvlan, hwsim, xfrm, macvtap, ... I don't see a l2 link between these other interfaces (only L3) but I could be wrong. So it would be necessary to reduce this complexity heavily to figure out what is not cleaning up the supplied skbuff.
I should most likely study the reproducer more but my current assumption is that you would end up with backtraces that look like veth is leaking skbs when you modify veth.c like this:
diff --git a/drivers/net/veth.c b/drivers/net/veth.c index 977861c46b1f..1d86e3869c77 100644 --- a/drivers/net/veth.c +++ b/drivers/net/veth.c @@ -344,12 +344,22 @@ static netdev_tx_t veth_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { struct veth_priv *rcv_priv, *priv = netdev_priv(dev); struct veth_rq *rq = NULL; + struct sk_buff *hack_skb; int ret = NETDEV_TX_OK; struct net_device *rcv; int length = skb->len; bool use_napi = false; int rxq; + hack_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!hack_skb) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return NET_XMIT_DROP; + } + + consume_skb(skb); + skb = hack_skb; + rcu_read_lock(); rcv = rcu_dereference(priv->peer); if (unlikely(!rcv) || !pskb_may_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN)) {But there is also a chance that actually net/dev/core.c is leaking it and it never reaches the veth driver.
I also don't get why we were contacted in private and why the kernel security list was involved in the first place.
Kind regards, Sven