Repository : ssh://git@diktynna/doc On branches: backup-redmine,main
commit b380c08ecc0ac0be627495c51d2aa2199f1752f1 Author: Linus Lüssing linus.luessing@c0d3.blue Date: Mon Jul 8 12:53:59 2024 +0000
doc: open-mesh/OpenHarbors
b380c08ecc0ac0be627495c51d2aa2199f1752f1 open-mesh/OpenHarbors.textile | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/open-mesh/OpenHarbors.textile b/open-mesh/OpenHarbors.textile index d119eabb..1bcaf4cc 100644 --- a/open-mesh/OpenHarbors.textile +++ b/open-mesh/OpenHarbors.textile @@ -72,8 +72,31 @@ Or in other words, move the 802.1x authenticator from the AP to a remote host of
h2. Scenario B) Hospital/University/Company/...
+!university-server-room-scenario-traditional.png!
-h3. (Additional) Use-cases & Benefits +* An exposed AP, visible/reachable by visitors +* A server with sensitive data +* Authorized employees/students/... accessing the server via WPA Enterprise from their laptop + +h3. Issue + +# Via easy social engineering (e.g. putting on the right cloths, suitcase, a ladder): +** can get physical access to the AP +# Can then copy the AP's flash and extract RADIUS credentials +# Can then replace with a rogue Man-in-the-Middle AP or install a backdoor +** If no extra encryption/authentication is used between AP<->server then can also simply add a snooping device between AP and wire +# Now has access to sensitive data in the locked server room + +h3. Solution + +!university-server-room-scenario-tunneled.png! + +# Like in scenario A), move the authenticator from the AP into the server room +# Client device will have encrypted communication into the server room, AP + wire becomes part of the untrusted medium +# No potential to Man-in-the-Middle from outside the server room +# Attacker now *needs a physical key* to the server room to get the sensitive data + +h2. (Additional) Use-cases & Benefits
This proposed, dynamic solution yields the following, additional interesting opportunities: